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AN ACADEMIC LAWYER PLAYS ARMCHAIR




"The antinomy between mind and body, word and deed, speech
and silence, overcome. Everything is only a metaphor; there is
only poetry."1 Philosophers, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, psychol-
ogists, social scientists of all hues of philosophic/theologic persua-
sion today as in the past adumbrate theories, justifications, systems,
nonsystems explaining man qua man, man qua man in society.
Theoretical postulates in various stages of proof or faith as
they respectively persuade thinking man of their efficacy, validity,
viability through their respective prophets, be they philosopher,
cleric, medical doctor, or soul doctor, find their way into the law
for good or ill. Such statements concerning the absolute or rela-
tive truth of man's "being' 2 often "find" their way into legal struc-
tures without close scrutiny as basic postulates, only to be "re-
discovered" and examined at a later date. No matter to what
jurisprudential school one belongs, it must be admitted that
"things" happen sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously
in the working of those institutions which we call legal, uncaring
whether a particular jurisprudential theory accounts for them or
not.
Lawyers, at least many theoreticians of the law, as well as
many practitioners, can look on formulations in disciplines formally
outside the law (at least the originators/finders believe their
theories to be outside the law) as found, discovered, invented or
merely "there" for the use of the legal system, if not within the
particular lawyer's definition of law. Some extant jurispruden-
tial schools define law so expansively as to include within it all
arts and sciences. Law becomes the interworking of all processes,
known, unknown, phenomenal, numeral, essential or existential.
* LL.B., 1965, Temple Law School; LL.M., 1966, Yale Law School; Mem-
ber of the California Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Nebraska. The author expresses his appreciation to the Nebraska Re-
search Council for funds provided for research on this article.
1 N. 0. BRowN, LovE's BODY 266 (1966).
2 Words themselves become associated with basic theories to such an
extent that we must often resort to analytical analysis merely to
indicate the meaning usage we wish to convey. See A. KoRzYBsKI,
SCIENCE AND SANITY: AN INTRoDucTIoN TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS
AND GENERAL SEMANICS (4th ed. 1958); H. WEINBERG, LEVELS or KNow-
ING AND EXISTENCE (1959).
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In short, many lawyers feel the responsibility of at least attempting
to categorize where possible or at least acknowledge where known
the relationship of fields of knowledge and experience to legal
frameworks.
But this prerogative of assimilating, identifying and attempting
relational explanation is no longer, if it ever was, peculiarly within
the lawyer's ambit. Notwithstanding all the complaints of the
"other-directedness" 3 of our modern society, we can discern a
trend, favorable or not, toward interdisciplinary exegesis of man's
situation. As certain elements of our society fall into increasingly
rigid and specialized modes of existence and perspective, others are
specializing in everything and, in some cases, in the vastness of
no-thing. Many are, in fact, aware that no discipline has a monop-
oly on theories of existence, but certain disciplines because of the
genius of our times have the potential for greater impact than
others.4 Erickson has indicated that, in his opinion, Luther's
Protestantism was an admixture of Luther's implicit genius, both
for constitutional and environmental reasons, and the "fortuity"
of the time within which he lived. The emphasis of theology in
our present society is political, ethical, psychoanalytic and, to a
much lesser extent than formerly, deistic. Increasingly the be-
havioral sciences have focused upon an analysis of modem
values. For example, a fast definition of the sociological term
"anomie" is "the state of being normless or without value commit-
ment in the relationship of the individual to society."
The purpose of this paper is to briefly analyze two levels of
potential and actual interrelationship between psychoanalytic in-
sights and legal working. The first is psychoanalysis as a total
philosophy of man, descriptive of man and all his institutions in-
cluding legal ones; the second is psychoanalysis as a tool for the
law where legal institutions seek for value reasons to intervene in
a particular situation where the psychology of an individual(s) is
at issue. The latter use of psychological theorems and methods
covers the legal spectrum from cases of "undue influence" in wills
to questions of "mens rea" in criminal, intent in torts, reliability
in evidence and "proper parent" in family law, to mention only a
few situations.
I intend to first indicate the obvious, i.e., that the law is pri-
marily concerned with the weighing and balancing of values. To
s To use the term of D. REISMAN, THE LONELY CROWD (1950).
4 ,By "because of . . ." I don't mean to indicate anything but the fact
that it seems particularly ripe at this time for certain disciplines, for
reasons beyond my ken but subject to analysis, to make a greater im-
pact on society than others.
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do this I will in very summary form explore some recent juris-
prudential formulations that do or do not cover within their defini-
tion the total nature of man. This becomes pertinent in examining
my first point-that psychoanalysis presents a total view of man
which may prove after examination to be in conflict with the law's
or a particular jurisprud's philosophical postulates. After this
very brief and necessarily inconclusive jurisprudential exercise, I
will attempt again summarily to indicate some extant psychologi-
cal theories and how they respectively convey different pictures of
man. I will finally focus upon psychoanalysis as a legal tool to
help the law make more "valid" decisions. For this purpose I
have selected the problem of intervention into the family unit as
of particular pertinency to our whole range of societal values and
where, if anywhere, psychoanalysis could prove a guiding re-
source. I have indicated my own value preferences, but the
purpose of this article is to suggest these points: (1) that the
lawyer must be aware of everything pertinent to human nature,
and (2) that despite all his knowledge he still must make his own
decisions. In light of present psychoanalytic learning I will main-
tain that the law should not seek out the individual case to
intervene affirmatively in human relationships unless and until
private persons begin adversary proceedings. Once the legal proc-
ess has been invoked, the question of psychiatric intervention is
more difficult and the outcome still speculative at best, as I will
attempt to show.
JURISPRUDENCE
The law has a long tradition of groping with values, ranging
from various natural law theories to analytical positivism, realism
of assorted natures and back to natural law theories. H. L. A. Hart
traces the heritage of analytical positivism through the utilitarians
and attempts to indicate the need for the law to make clear, deci-
sive distinctions between itself and morality.5 Hart acknowledges
the convergence of law with morality at certain points. Moreover,
he does not eschew the moral responsibility of the individual- when
confronted with a law he deems intrinsically evil. -The individual
then, in the best tradition of civil disobedience, must be prepared -to
pay the penalty for nonconformity with the particular or series of
prescriptions; of course, we realize that the Anglo/American legal
system has much flexibility and will mitigate in case of strong
moral pressure on the system. But such pressure necessarily comes
from effective groups or elites6 that have emotional commitments
5 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 -IARv. L.
REv. 593 (195a). " .:
6 To fall into the suggested meta-language postulated-by McDougal and
762 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 4 (1967)
either to the particular substantive ideal espoused by the noncon-
forming civil disobeyer, or to the fairness of the procedural meth-
odology utilized to implement the substantive prescription in ques-
tion. It is epigrammatic at this point to emphasize the importance
of legal procedure to our legal framework.
Lon L. Fuller in his celebrated rejoinder to Professor Hart
asserted the impossibility of having a legal system dedicated to the
dignity of man which separates law and morality.7 He speaks of
the "inner morality of the law" by which he means that without
certain procedural elements a mere prescription even with judicial
backing will be unable to gain adherence from society. One com-
mentator describes Fuller's view of man as "more in terms of proc-
ess than in terms of substance; it is more voluntaristic than ration-
alistic; it is more Dionysian than Apollonian. In other words, the
'supreme end' or 'ultimate destiny' of man, were Fuller to use those
terms, is conceived not as a stage of human development to be
achieved at some moment once and for all; not as a state than
can be realized and that, once realized, results in the cessation of
desire and movement; not as a condition of static perfection.
Rather the 'supreme end' or 'ultimate destiny' of man is a quality
of living, a mode of developing, a character of action that must be
rechosen and reactualized again and again in each new moment of
living, in each new stage of development, in each new instant of
action. It is this understanding of man that leads Fuller to pay
close attention to the procedural aspects of legal institutions, for
correctness of procedures in institutional process is the correlative
of rightness of quality in individual living. Institutional procedures
are adjudged correct from the standpoint of the universal princi-
ples of natural law to the extent to which they keep alive the
purposive side of man's nature and maintain communication.
'8
I am not concerned here with umpiring or casting sides in the
Hart/Fuller debate but merely with indicating two obvious points:
(1) jurisprudence as at least a subset of practical philosophy must
and does concern itself with the nature of man in describing or
structuring a theory of law, and (2) jurisprudence in dealing with
prescriptions and judicial interpretations alone must and does con-
Lasswell in their behavioral science-oriented jurisprudence, Law, Sci-
ence, and Policy. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253
(1967).
T Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A reply to Professor Hart, 71
HAv. L. Rzv. 630 (1958).
8 Sturm, Lon Fuller's Multidimensional Natural Law Theory, 18 STAN.
L. REv. 612, 619 (1966).
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cern itself with values of man and man in society. Fuller would
bring morality, i.e., a set of either "naturally" held or acquired
values, within the definition of law; Hart might in all but the
penumbral area9 exclude morality from the definition of law. But
both, to reiterate, are concerned with the problem of "bad" law, of
"bad" values and the obligation of the individual to conform or
breach those prescriptions which are, he deems, personally odious.
Both would agree that the aim of the law should be toward the
"good." It is not an easy question to determine which theory
posited is more protective of the individual and more conducive
to such an aim as human dignity.
If the law does and should take morality into question, the
individual who feels compelled to resist a particular legal policy
will perhaps have a more difficult time in asserting the rectitude
of his position; he will be told that the law has already taken
morality into consideration, and if not, in fact, the quintessence
of morality, the law at least represents the minimum of morality.
If, on the other hand, the law "should" separate legal from moral
questions, the nonconforming individual can assert that the law is
generally ethically neutral and therefore must give priority to in-
dividual morality. He will be answered that at least in certain
areas the law does take morality into consideration if only coinci-
dentally and that implicit within any legal system there is a
moral norm, i.e., conformity or, if you will, fidelity to the law to
preserve existing values. Practically or realistically, the individual,
despite his theoretical argument from one or the other of the pre-
vailing definitions of law, will find himself in the same position.
He will find it necessary to appeal to certain values either con-
tained within the legal system or held by the community, despite
what interpretation and prescription say, so as to transmute or miti-
gate the sanction accorded for his recalcitrance. If the individual's
position rests on an effective value base, thereby appealing to the
society or those members of society who do or can exercise pres-
sure (effective elite), the legal system will mitigate or attempt as
much as possible to cajole him from or neutralize his position. We
all understand the reluctance of the court in finally incarcerating
David Miller for breaking probation by participating in an anti-
Vietnam demonstration and particularly for refusing to carry a
draft card. Miller had been put on probation for draft card burn-
ing. His sincerity plus perhaps the court's feeling toward the
) It is not necessary here to reanalyze the respective positions of Hart
and Fuller on problems of interpretation of the penumbra; the reader
can make his own judgment from the literature already developed on
both sides.
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statute allowed the court to accord him merely probation. Miller's
press coverage seemed to me to be rather sympathetic. He was
standing and is standing for an important value position in this
nation, and the legal system, both because of sympathy with it
residing in the court and because of felt sympathy or anticipated
sympathy from "non-legal" institutions, was prone to be "soft" on
Miller as long as he could be held in check in the future.
The Miller case is as yet not over. The appellate courts can
certainly decide that the probation conditions were in derogation
of other values, i.e., freedom of speech and .assembly. Practically
such a position would strengthen the value position of speech and
assembly and increase community respect for legal institutions
which show sympathy and understanding for even the recalci-
trant. We can contrast the Miller case with the case of the ex-
heavyweight champion of the world, Mohammed Ali. The press
which was sympathetic or at least generally neutral to the sincere,
upstanding Miller, has been for the most part, with certain notable
exceptions,0 condemnatory of the "dupe" of black power. Ali has
been accorded none of the respect of a Miller because society finds
his religion repugnant and antithetical to shared values of the
wider community. This followed despite the fact that Ali could
certainly have had an easy time if he had denounced his held
values and conformed to the system; he would have been a most
popular champion and a more wealthy one. And the likelihood
of his ever having had to fight as a soldier was indeed small.
I am repeating a very old message in the contrast between
Miller and Ali, that the force of non-legal institutions in society
exercises great weight in the operation of legal machinery. Mil-
ler's position is certainly not an "easy" personal choice, and he has
undoubtedly suffered for it and despite my earlier analysis will
probably continue to suffer for it.
Our question then becomes a most complex one of the how and
particularly the why of invocation of legal processes. Arnold has
demonstrated the importance of symbolic 'action in our legal
system despite the result of that action." The power of the press
on legal institutions has just recently been reaccorded judicial rec-
ognition in Sheppard and Eftes. We have heard, read, and debated
the recognized broad limit of prosecutorial discretion. The Amer-
ican legal realists have indicated the importance of coming off a
10 Wicker, In the Nation: Muhammad Ali and Dissent, N.Y. Times, May
2, 1967, at 42, col. 5.
11 T. ARNOLD, TA' SYMBOLS OF GOVtERNMENT (1935); see also Kaplan, Book
Review, 46 NEB. L. REV. 737 (1967).
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logic-chopping Olympus and taking a long hard look at society and
its impact on the law and at the men who man the legal institu-
tions, men who are obviously members of society at least in their
spare time. Lawyers have at least become verbally more sophisti-
cated today. We acknowledge and attempt to make use of the
broad range of sciences available. McDougal and Lasswell, inter
alia, have devised a definition of law which encompasses all knowl-
edge of man.'2 They have enumerated a series of values which
when shared, and shared by as many of the community as possible
(a refinement of the Utilitarian calculus), should hopefully lead
to human dignity.
Theirs is a jurisprudential methodology which specifically at-
tempts to use all the knowledge we have at our disposal to under-
stand how man acts, how his actions structure or modify legal
institutions, and ultimately how legal institutions can structure
for the benefit of society and the individual. And the one system
of human thought which is necessarily relevant to such an ac-
tivist jurisprudence is the area of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and
psychology, with its explanations of man's perspectives and actions
both by and for himself and in the wider community."
Returning to Fuller's concept of the "inner morality" of the
law, we can see that inner morality makes sense as a natural law
postulate, not as a rule from on high, but because man must be
capable of understanding and emotionally endorsing a legal system.
He cannot follow laws he cannot understand or which do not have
at least a modicum of internal consistency. This does not mean
that legal institutions cannot change man, but that such change
can occur only through an understanding of the individual psyche
and the relationship of that psyche to external conditions, objects
.and other psyches. To requote from Sturm on Fuller: "Rather
the 'supreme end' or 'ultimate destiny' of man is a quality of liv-
ing, a mode of developing, a character of action that must be re-
chosen and reactualized again and again in each new moment of
living, in each new stage of development, in each new instant of
action."'14 We have here an ontological statement of man which
conforms with the position of existential philosophy which in turn
12 See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253 (1967).
13 This obviously stretches into the area of sociology; but I will leave
the analysis of relevant sociological theory aside for the purpose of this
brief appraisal without gainsaying its validity to such a discussion as
I am undertaking here. See generally F. DAvs, H. FOSTER, C. JEFFERY
& E. DAvis, SociETY AND THE LAW (1962).
14 Sturm, supra note 8.
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in Europe and to a lesser extent in America has become the base
for a psychoanalytic theory and methodology. 15
PSYCHOANALYSIS
If, as I think rightly to be the case, psychiatry in its many
theoretical forms and methods is relevant to the working of legal
institutions, the question becomes what kind of rapprochement
can be made between these two viable, non-static bodies of
knowledge and experience. 6 In fact, the problem is one of step-
ping back and reexamining the place of psychiatry in the legal
process. Professor Paulson impresses on us the impact of psychia-
try and related social work in the area of juvenile disposition.17
"A Children's Bureau publication of 1929 characterized the new
court [Family Court]: 'The old courts relied upon the learning of
lawyers; the new courts depend more upon psychiatrists and social
workers .... Justice in the old courts was based on legal science;
in the new courts it is based on social engingeering [sic].'-1 He
goes on to quote from Judge Julian Mack "' The physical and
mental condition of the child must be known . . .therefore ...
every child, before hearing, shall be subject to a thoroughly sci-
entific psycho-physical examination.' "19
The criminal law has become so dependent upon psychiatric
expertise as to call for reappraisal of the psychiatrist's role and to
question the ethical neutrality of the psychiatrist in an adversary
proceeding.20  The whole area of civil commitment has been
usurped or rather ceded by the law to psychiatric experts.21 One
of the most ardent opponents of too much reliance on the psychia-
tric profession is advanced by Dr. Thomas S. Szasz, himself a psy-
chiatrist.
.A5 See generally PSYcHOANALYSIS AND ExIsTENTIAL PHILosoPHY (H. Ruiten-
beek ed. 1962).
16 For a discussion and appraisal of this question as to criminal responsi-
bility, see Louisell & Diamond, Law and Psychiatry: Dgtente, Entente
or Concomitance, 50 CORNELL L. REv. (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Louisell].
'7 Paulson, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 694 (1966).
.18 Id. at 714.
19 Id.
20'Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, Archives of Criminal
Psychodynamics, III 221 (1959), reprinted in part in R. DONNELLY, J.
* GOLDSTEIN & R. ScHwARTz, CRIMINAL LAW 798 (1962).
21 For the best collection of extant' cases in the area of civil commitment,
see J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERsHOWITz, PsYcHOANALYsIS PsYcHIATRY
AND LAW (1967) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
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Psychiatric activity is medical in name only. For the most part,
psychiatrists are engaged in attempts to change the behavior and
values of individuals, groups, institutions, and sometimes even of
nations.. . . Further, that insofar as they are social engineers,
their goal is to advance not ethical but health values. Instead
of remaking individuals and society to give greater scope, say to
individualism and critical rationalism, as the philosophers of the
Enlightenment sought to do, the modern psychiatrist tries to re-
make individuals and society to promote mental health. So-called.
health values have thus tended to replace moral and political
values.
2 2
Professor Dershowitz has in kind recently inveighed against the ab-
dication of judicial responsibility in the same area-civil commit-
ment.
23
To rearticulate our question then we must decide not whether
psychiatry is relevant to any particular or the whole organic legal
system but how and where to apply or exclude it in any par-
ticular area. An assessment of the place of psychiatry vis-i-vis
the law is the type of problem particularly suited to the lawyer
who is by training and responsibility hopefully equipped to make
value decisions in the light of conflicting policy considerations.
Professor Green has indicated that, "it need not be stressed how
fatal it may be for the advocate to be blind to the environmental
facts of his case, unable to formulate the policies that lie beneath,
or inadequate in doctrinal articulation. Nor need it be stressed
that with an enterprise, industrial, and now a political world in
such ferment the advocate's power to behold the environmental
facts of his problem, sense the policies they command, and reduce
to doctrinal language the significance of both is the supreme power
he can possess.12 4 We can certainly add that the law itself must
lose respect if it fails to take into consideration bodies of knowl-
edge available and relevant to human interaction in society.
The advocate, the judge, the legislator and the executive (in-
cluding agencies) then all have the responsibility of assimilating
and wisely using the total knowledge of man so as to reduce any
cultural lag between the law and existing knowledge. But a fine
balance must be struck, in that reliance on unproved or conflicting
theory represents an abdication of responsibility on the part ,of
legal institutions. Moreover, the law as a working, practical sys-
tem of decision-makers must look for the practical ramifications- of
the application of theoretical postulates in relative degrees of proof
as preached, taught and applied by itself or other practicing prac-
22 Szasz, Preface to T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PsYCHATRY at vii (1963).
23 THE HARvARD LAW REPORTER, April 13, 1967, at 2-3.
24 Green, 'Port Law Public Law in. Disguise, 38 TExAs L. REv. 257, 265-66
(1960).
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titioners. (There must necessarily be some gap between the trans-
lation of a theory into practical operation.) Obviously, legal in-
stitutions can use the knowledge and expertise of related learnings
in assorted ways and certainly without reliance on the practitioners
of the particular theory. This is, as already somewhat indicated,
necessary for the mere operation of our legal system. We con-
stantly have used psychological insights, sometimes without aware-
ness and sometimes purposively. The law must take human psy-
chology implicitly or explicitly into account in order to function.
If we turn to criminal law we can examine the whole development
of fault (mens rea) as a doctrine. A very much simplified descrip-
tion of criminal definition would state that for a crime to be im-
puted, the person committing the act must have an evil inten-
tion.25 In our law of evidence, we have made common-sense con-
clusions that certain statements will or will not be admissible
because of their relative reliability, drawn from the law's under-
standing of human nature. Evidence, in short, draws much of its
application from human psychology as interpreted by legal institu-
tions which may or may not explicitly refer to external theoretical
and practical bodies of psychology. We as lawyers acknowledge
the necessity for decision-making and value selection without the
availability of knowledge which perhaps in the future will clarify
and simplify decision-making. The law must necessarily act with
the resources it has at hand. And among these resources is the
body of behavioral science knowledge. Guttmacher has stated:
"It may seem startling to think of the psychiatrist as preceptor in
legal, moral, and political philosophy, but by throwing light on
man's potentialities for growth, and on the factors which lead
individuals to retreat from maturity and growth, psychiatry helps
law to focus on its goal, the development of the individual's po-
tentialities for freedom and productiveness. '26 But as lawyers we
have the special burden of exploring extant psychological theory
before further application and infusion into the legal process.,
Katz, Goldstein and Dershowitz in their recent casebook 27 state
that "'Law' . . . may be defined as an essential part of man's
reality, a mechanism for moulding and reinforcing controls over
himself in relation to others, a process of assigning to some man-
25 It is beyond the purpose of this particular article to explore the fault
and nonfault bases of criminal liability in our present application of
the criminal law.
26 M. GUTTMACHER & H. WIEHOFEN, PsYcHiATRY AND = LAW 11 (1952).
27 Katz, supra note 21, is more than merely a casebook but rather is a
probing collection of materials which purposively suggest relevant
problems in the application of psychiatric and psychoanalytic theory
to legal institutions.
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made authority, i.e., the State, the power to decide why, under
what circumstances, to what extent, and by what means man, as a
private person, is to be restrained or encouraged in the making and
implementing of individual decisions. Law is, in turn, a device for
controlling the State-i.e., the individual as official-decision making
agent of the State-in the exercise of its power over man. The
underlying question always confronting the decision-makers and
those concerned with the study of law is whether, how and to what
extent the State should not or should be authorized to intervene
in what would otherwise be the private ordering of a man's life.
"J28
Using this for a working definition of law, how then can we
define psychiatry, psychoanalysis and psychology to fit their re-
spective teachings into use in the legal framework where we as
lawyers deem them relevant.
Psychiatry is the medical specialty concerned with the study,
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of behavior disorders. Amer-
ica's most original modern psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan,
defined psychiatry as the science of human relations. The scope
of psychiatry is admittedly broad; indeed, Alan Gregg once half-
seriously remarked that psychiatry is a generality and not a spe-
cialty. Nevertheless, Sullivan's definition is too encompassing. It
applies overall to the sciences of human behavior but not to psy-
chiatry alone;'it is so far-reaching as to invite psychiatrists to as-
sume an absurd sense of omniscience. Psychiatry is an applied
science that deals with abnormal human behavior. Psychiatrists
are primarily scientifically informed medical practitioners whose
task is to help people, not with all, but with certain kinds of
difficulties. To accomplish this requires not only psychiatric re-
search but contributions from disciplines that are basic sciences
for psychiatry; these explore the spectrum of human or animal
behavior largely in an experimental framework and often with
systematic and theoretical interest.2 9
But psychiatry and psychoanalysis in attempting as medical
"schools" to cure certain kinds of mental problems encompass dif-
fering methodologies to cure "mental illness" and differences in
their whole Weltanschauung.
Psychoanalysis . . . is particularly enticing in its potential ap-
plicability to social entities. Psychoanalysis is concerned with the
most basic of all human psychological forces: sex and aggression,
love and hate. Psychoanalysis is preoccupied with the origin,
growth and development, and ultimate expression of these deep
human drives. Sex and aggression are conceived of as innate
biological forces -which undergo an incredibly varied series of
28 Id. at 2.
29 F. REDLicH & D. FREEmAN, THE THEORY AND PRAcTIcE oF PsycHIATRY 1
(1966) (footnotes omitted).
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transformations before they manifest themselves in their adult
mature forms. Detrimental influences, both intra and extrapsy-
chic, affect the development and vicissitudes of these biological
drives. If the noxious influences are not overcome, psychopathol-
ogy results. The symptoms of the resultant psychopathological
states are explainable as consequences of the dynamic interaction
of the pathological drives and the defenses of the ego. In short,
the psychodynamic mechanisms explain and account for the
manifestations of psychical disease, and these same mechanisms
provide the means for the remedial process through the tech-
niques of psychoanalytic therapy.30
Freud himself extrapolated from his psychoanalytic theory to the
nature and potential of mankind,3 ' warning, however, of the
wholesale application of his theories to social contexts.3 2 Freudian
theory has, however, been applied to the nature of man in society
brilliantly on a theoretical level in souring fashion so as to provide
the basis of man breaking through his historic boundaries into
the postulated state of his potential being.
[P]sychoanalysis offers a theoretical framework for exploring
the possibility of a way out of the nightmare of endless
"progress" and endless Faustian discontent, a way out of human
neurosis, a way out of history. In the case of the neurotic in-
dividual, the goal of psychoanalytical therapy is to free him from
the burden of his past, from the burden of his history, the bur-
den which compels him to go on having (and being) a case his-
tory. And the method of psychoanalytical therapy is to deepen
the historical consciousness of the individual ("fill up the mem-
ory-gaps") till he awakens from his own history as from a
nightmare. Psychoanalytical consciousness, as a higher stage in
the general consciousness of mankind, may be likewise the ful-
fillment of the historical consciousness, that ever widening and,
deepening search for origins which has obsessed Western thought
80 Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations
Concerning Welfare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
357, 357-58 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Diamond].
31 See S. FREuD, CIVrIZATON AND iTs DiscoNTENTs (Riviere transl. 1930)
[hereinafter cited as Freud].
82 "But it behooves us to be very careful, not to forget that after all we
are dealing only with analogies, and that it is dangerous, not only
with men but also with concepts, to drag them out of the region where
they originated and have matured. The diagnosis of collective neu-
roses, moreover, will be confronted by a special difficulty. In the
neurosis of an individual we can use as a starting-point the contrast
presented to us between the patient and his environment which we
assume to be 'normal.' No such background as this would be available
for any society similarly affected; it would have to be supplied in some
other way. And with regard to any therapeutic application of our
knowledge, what would be the use of the most acute analysis of social
neurosis, since no one possesses power to compel the community to
adopt the therapy?" Id. at 141-42. To be found also in Diamond, supra
note 30, at 359.
RELEVANCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TO THE LAW 771
ever since the Renaissance. If historical consciousness is finally
transformed into psychoanalytical consciousness, the grip of the
dead hand of the past on life in the present would be loosened,
and man would be ready to live instead of making history, to
enjoy instead of paying back old scores and debts, and to enter
that state of Being which was the goal of his Becoming.33
Classical Freudian theory is grounded on the opposition of
two instincts, the sexual and the aggressive, (or if one prefers) life
and death. Although there is a constant conflictual interaction
between these constitutional instincts, they can combine or be chan-
neled for the good of society through socialization via sublima-
tion.3 4 Later Freudians have postulated that the ego is capable
of conflict-free activity.3 5 Rapaport has indicated that neither the
Berkelian view of man (a solipsistic view in which man is inde-
pendent of environment but dependent on internal forces) nor the
Cartesian postulate (man is born free, independent from within
but dependent on his environment) presents the true picture of
man in society.3 6
Observation confirms neither of these views. It shows that while
man's behavior is determined by drive forces which originate in
him, it is not totally at their mercy since it has a certain inde-
pendence from them. We refer to this independence as the au-
tonomy of the ego from the id. The most common observation
which necessitated this conception was the responsiveness and
relevance of behavior to external reality. But this dependence of
behavior on the external world and on experience is not complete
either. Man can interpose delay and thought not only between
instinctual promptings. and action, modifying and even indefi-
nitely postponing drive discharge, he can likewise modify and
postpone his reaction to external stimulation. This independence
of behavior from external stimulation we will refer to as the
autonomy of the ego from external reality. Since the ego is
never completely independent from the id nor from external
reality, we always speak about relative autonomy.37
38 N. 0. BROWN, L=FE AGAINST DEATH 19 (1959) [hereinafter cited as N. 0.
Brown). See also H. MAcusE, ERos'Am CivizATIO (1955), for a
similar attempt to use Freudian doctrine to extricate man from his
present state to a new consciousness.
84 It is outside the scope of this article to describe in any -depth Freud's
instinctual and energy theory which is the very basis of his doctrine.
See C. BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBooK OF PsYcHoANALYsIs, (1956),
for a clear description of Freudian psychoanalysis.
-
85 See generally H. HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF
. 'ADAPTATION (1939), reprinted in part in Katz, supra note 21, at 307.
36 Rapaport, The Theory of Ego Autonomy: A Generalization, 22 BuL-
LETIN OF THE MENNINGER CLINIC 13 (1958), reprinted in part in Katz,
supra note 21; at 300.
37. Katz, supra note 21, at 301. Freud's own position indicates at least the
sentiment that the individual must be held to individual, responsibility.
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Despite Freud's assertion of the individual's personal respon-
sibility for his acts and despite the more recent formulation of
Rapaport of the individual's relative autonomy, Freudian psycho-
analysis presages little hope for the individual to free himself from
his environmental bonds. Freud, and Brown following in his path,
conclude their respective works38 with this presage:
Men have brought their powers of subduing the forces of nature
to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily
exterminate one another to the last man. They know this-hence
arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their
mood of apprehension. And now it may be expected that the
other of the two 'heavenly forces,' eternal Eros, will put forth his
strength so as to maintain himself alongside of his equally im-
mortal adversary.3 9
This is hardly an augury of optimism.
C. G. Jung, who broke with Freud and abandoned Freud's
instinctual dialectic, affirmed the capability of the individual psyche
to free itself from its external environment and achieve a "mana"
state through a process of eternal discovery of "self." Jung calls
this the "individuation" process.40 Glover attacked the Jungian
psychic paradigm and all other pretenders to psychic truth in
an illuminatory comparison between the two schools. 41 Glover's
attack was particularly vehement in defense of the Freudian in-
stinctual duality. 42 Nevertheless, the so-called Neo-Freudian school
"Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of
one's dreams. What else is one to do with them? Unless the content of
the dream (rightly understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part
of my own being. If I seek to classify the impulses that are present in
me according to social standards into good and bad, I must assume
responsibility for both sorts; and if, in defence, I say that what is
unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my 'ego,' then I
shall not be basing my position upon psycho-analysis .... The phy-
sician will leave it to the jurist to construct for social purposes a
responsibility that is artificially limited to the metapsychological ego."
19 S. FREUD, COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 131
(Standford ed. 1961). This quote can be found in Louisell, supra note
16, at 219.
88 Freud, supra note 31; N. 0. Brown, supra note 33.
39 Id.
40 C. JUNG, Two ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1953), is the best
exposition of Jungian dynamics, by Jung himself. For a fictionalized
account of the power of individual Jungian archetype see H. HESSE,
DEMIAN (1919), an earlier and I think inferior example of the work
of this master novelist.
41 E. GLOVER, FREUD OR JUNG? (1950).
42 See H. BENOIT, THE SUPREME DOCTRINE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES IN ZEN
THOUGHT (1951), for the affinity between the Freudian dialectic and
Zen theory.
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abandoned Freud's instinctual theory positing that man was condi-
tioned solely by his environment.43
Neurosis or, to speak more broadly, mental illness, was shown to
be the upshot of insecurity and anxiety (Sullivan); insecurity and
anxiety were shown to be generated most frequently-almost in-
fallibly-by competition (Homey); competition was shown to be
the necessary consequence of the quest for individual self-valida-
tion in an egalitarian, competitive society of conflicting -values(Alexander); and our egalitarian, competitive society was shown
to be the product of a long-term evolution of social institutions(Kardiner). Neo-Freudian social philosophy therefore seems to
point to the melancholy conclusion that an extensive incidence of
mental illness is inherent in modem Western society, to say noth-
ing of an unavoidable trend toward social breakdown.44
Margolis comments, "Here we have full-fledged social criticism
presented as medicine; small wonder that some members of the
neo-Freudian movement have found it necessary to construct or
suggest visions of a utopian society.145 Erickson, using a Freudian
framework, has greatly contributed to an analysis of an epigenetic
development of man. He posits as his ideal the integrated man
who is the product of an "ongoing" development passing safely
and successfully through life crisis states common to the develop-
ment of all.46
For man's psychosocial survival is safeguarded only by vital vir-
tues which develop in the interplay of successive and overlapping
generations, living together in organized settings. Here, living
together means more than incidental proximity. It means that
the individual's lifestages are 'interliving,' cogwheeling with the
stages of others which move him along as he moves them. I
have, therefore, in recent years, attempted to delineate the whole
life-cycle as an integrated psychosocial phenomenon, instead of
following what (in analogy to teleology) may be called the 'origi-
nalogical' approach, that is, the attempt to derive the meaning of
development primarily from a reconstruction of the infant's be-
ginnings. 47
Erickson goes on to indicate the respective crises which the devel-
oping individual must confront, survive and surpass. Often in this
scheme the individual will only partially achieve the next stage of
his development. Moreover, only partial resolution will leave resi-
due from a particular stage with the individual as he reaches
adulthood.
43 See generally M. BIRNBACH, NEo-FREuDIAN SOCIAL PHmosoPHY (1961).
44 Id. at 128.
45 J. MTARaOLIS, PSYCHOTHERAPY & MORALITY 81 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Margolis].
46 E. ERICKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBITY 114 (1964). See also E. ERICK-
SON, CHLDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963).
47 E. ERICKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILIrY 114 (1964).
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Finally, we must mention the newest and yet perhaps the
oldest psychoanalytic school, i.e., existential analysis. 48 The ex-
istential approach denies the validity of all but a total view of
man's being in the world.49 Correspondingly and unsurprisingly
existentialism as a philosophy has been adopted by a psychiatric
movement as both a theory of man and a methodology to "cure"
man or rather to help man live with his ontological anxiety.50
Binswanger, a contemporary of Freud, has listed some trends com-
mon to the existential psychiatric orientation:
(1) A psychotherapy on existential-analytic bases investigates
the life-history of the patient to be treated .... It does not
explain this life-history and its pathologic idiosyncrasies according
to the teaching of any school of psychotherapy, or by means of its
preferred categories. Instead, it understands this life-history as
modifications of the total structure of the patient's being-in-the
world....
(2) A psychotherapy on existential-analytic bases thus pro-
ceeds not merely by showing the patient where, when and to
what extent he has failed to realize the fullness of his humanity,
but it tries to make him experience this as radically as possible.
(3) [T]he existential analyst ... will always stand on the
same plane with his patients-the plane of common existence ....
He will ... consider the bond between the two partners ...
an encounter on what Martin Buber calls the "sharp edge of
existence" .... 51
Existential psychoanalysis then is more a way of looking at
the individual, a perspective of the individual as a being in society
with all the problems implicit therein, rather than one core the-
ory of man's dynamics. But this does not mean that existential
psychoanalysis is only a methodology which would, of course, be
important in itself. A perspective of man as an ontological being
has a definite impact on both the type of therapy invoked by the
practitioner and the theoretical view of what man's condition ac-
tually is and may become. Sarte's famous "Man's essence is his
existence," has been interpreted by Tillich to mean "that man is a
48 "Existentialism [as a philosophy] is a timeless sensibility that can be
discerned here and there in the past; but it is only in recent times that
it has hardened into a sustained protest and preoccupation." ExIsTEN-
TIALISM FROM DOSTOESKY TO SARTRE 12 (W. Kaufmann ed. 1956).
49 J. SARTRE, ExISTENTiAL PsYcHoANALYSIs 60 (1953).
50 See V. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGO-
THERAPY (1963).
51 Binswanger, Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy, in PsYcnoANAL-
YsIS AND ExIsTENTTAL PHILosoPHY 19-21 (R. Ruitenbeek ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as Ruitenbeek].
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being of whom no essence can be affirmed, for such an essence
would introduce a permanent element, contradictory to man's pow-
er of transforming himself indefinitely. According to Sarte, man is
what he acts to be."' 52 Tillich continues, "Man breaks through his
environment in all directions, his language is his liberation from
bondage to a limited situation. But this freedom is not easy to
accept and many people turn back from the openness of their world
to the prison of their environment. ' 53 According to the dictates of
the existential psychoanalytic view, man must be prepared to
throw off false security and accept his ontological alienation; he
must confront his nothingness to be truly free.
Instead of speaking in terms of internal dynamics employed
by Freudian dynamics, existential analysis uses descriptive, meta-
phorical terms. Laing, for example, cites the patient who in group
therapy interrupted, "I can't go on. You are arguing in order to
have the pleasure of triumphing over me. At best you win an
argument. At worst you lose an argument. I am arguing in
order to preserve my existence. '54 This Laing calls "engulfment"
where "basic security is so low that practically any relationship
with another person, however tenuous or however apparently
'harmless,' threatens to overwhelm him."55 He goes on to define
"implosion" as "a threat to what identity the individual is able to
suppose himself to have, 'depersonalization' and 'petrification' as
defensive acts of (1) fearing being turned to stone, (2) the dread
of this happening, (3) the magical act of turning someone else to
stone.5 16
In existential analysis we're dealing with the terror and poetry
of being in relation to ourselves and how we react when confronted
by the alien world with the implicit dread of death, nothingness,
rejection. The existential therapist plays an active part in the
therapy, be it in a group or in a one-to-one relationship. He is
concerned not so much with past states of mind nor the etiology of
such states, as the creation or restoration of a present meaning
to existence.
Becker, similarly using Dewey rather than Freud as a "philo/
psychical" base, posits four questions common to each individual
needing answer by each individual for himself: "(1) What kind
52 Tilich, Existentialism and Psychotherapy, in Ruitenbeek, supra note 51,
at 5.
53 Ruitenbeek, supra note 51, at 16.
54 Laing, Ontological Insecurity, in Ruitenbeek, supra note 51, at 46.
55 Ruitenbeek, supra note 51, .at 47.
56 Ruitenbeek, supra note 51, at 49-50.
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of reactions is one to expect from volatile human-objects? (2)
What are the supports and limitations of my powers? (3) In what
sequential schema is my action to be embedded? (4) How can I
best orient my action to safety and to maximum satisfaction?
57
Allport has edited a series of poignant letters which indicate the
life style, pride, fear, aloneness, recalcitrance and ultimate end of
one Jenny who lived and breathed. 58 At the outset he queries,
"Do ordinary psychological rubrics adequately fit Jenny's case?
One might label her as hysterical, overprotective, aggressive, aso-
cial, extrapunitive, an isolate, paranoid, having a character disorder.
But do these categories singly or in combination represent the
focal disposition of her unique being."59 After a presentation of
the letters, without comment, Allport proceeds in summary form
to apply various psychological theories to "explain" Jenny, to an-
alyze her as success or failure, normal or abnormal. Whether it be
Allport's inability, lack of information, or unwillingness to probe
Jenny to a greater extent with each particular theoretical paradigm
(one doubts any lack of ability or interest) or the unsatisfactoriness
of any of the theories to explain the person living in the letters, the
subjective reader rebels against affixing single descriptive or dy-
namic labels summing up and shelving Jenny (whether we would
have liked her or not).
To complicate matters further, commentators and practitioners
often reach differing "answers" applying the same basic theory.
Brown, without renouncing Freud, has changed position and now
feels that the individual can attain a new state of being without
the modification or restructuring of his societal environment."0
Marcuse answers Brown, "You have revealed the latent, the true
content of politics-you know that the political fight is the fight for
the whole: not the mystical whole, but the very unmystical,
antagonistic whole of our life and that of our children-the only
life that is."61 Brown rejoins, "From politics to life. And therefore
revolution as creation; resurrection; renaissance instead of prog-
ress. To perceive in all human culture the hidden reality of the
human body. This is to discover as Freud did, the Holy Com-
munion as the basis of community; the Eucharist, the cannibalism,
the hidden eating; one of the forms of which is war-making chil-
57 E. BECKER, THE REVOLUTION IN PsYCHIATRY, THE NEw UNDERSTANDING OF
MAN 12 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Becker].
58 J. MAsTERsON, LETTERS FROM JENNY (G. Allport ed. 1965).
59 Allport, Preface to id. at viii.
G0 N. 0. BROWN, LovE's BODY (1966).
61 Marcuse, Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman 0. Brown, CoMMEN-
TARY, Feb., 1967, Vol. 43, No. 2, at 61, 65.
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dren pass through the fire unto Moloch. Go to the end of the road
and that is what you will find. And so the God is not Freud's God
Logos, abstract or disembodied Reason, but the Human Form Di-
vine. And the language is the language not of reason but of love.
Reason is power; powerful arguments; power-politics; Realpolitik;
reality-principal. Love comes emptyhanded (Love's Body, p. 237);
the eternal proletariat; like Cordelia, bringing Nothing."62
Hoping for Brown's sublime state (Apocalypse, Nirvana, Sa-
tori, as you like it), we lawyers or at least most of us are like
Marcuse still earthbound. And we are confronted with the prob-
lem of the Brown/MViarcuse colloquy multiplied, including, inter alia
Jungian and Existential insight beside the Freudian. The theories
lead man to differing realities, through differing methodologies.
In short the various psychoanalytic theories are more than methods
of "curing" "neurosis" or "psychosis." They present philosophical
postulates calling man to live in particular modes to attain "mental
health" ends, "integration" or a new sensibility free of repression.
They vary in their optimism, some presaging man's potential
destruction, some promising nothing but Promethean struggle for
those who are willing to accept freedom, and some indicating that
the individual despite the society can achieve a mystic Oneness.
But for a truer picture it must be indicated this presents the
particular theories in their ultimate. They present intermediate
stages but with intermediate result. If we acknowledge the exis-
tential anxiety of each individual, that which Sartre labels "nau-
sea," can and should we separate this common feeling from a more
pathological neurosis or neurosis in extremis, i.e., psychosis (neu-
rosis perhaps on the far end of the continuum of man's experiential
potential). Tillich points "to. . . [this] difference and confusion of
existential and neurotic anxiety, of existential and neurotic guilt,
of existential and neurotic emptiness .... The decisive question
here is whether one believes that it is possible to remove by suc-
cessful analysis not only neurotic forms of anxiety but also its
genuine forms-the anxieties of finitude, of guilt, of emptiness."(6 3
It would seem that often what we call neurosis is a defense
against the more frightening fear of aloneness and of ultimate in-
dividual confrontation with death, which is amplified in our Bomb-
scared society to include the fear of ultimate and yet too immediate
threat not only to the individual but to all his family, friends,
society and values. It would seem a greater threat than merely
62 Brown, A Reply to Herbert Marcuse, COMMENTARY, March 1967, Vol.
43, No. 2, at 83, 83-84.
638 Tillich, Existentialism and Psychotherapy, in supra note 51, at 12-13.
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the snuffing out of one's individual life that nothing will remain to
carry on lifework.
By now it should be obvious that psychiatry and psychoanaly-
sis are necessarily value laden, pointing, if their theories admit of an
"answer," to a superior mode of living depending on the particular
theory of psychology and its crypto-idealistic philosophical base if
any.
Psychotherapy then, is primarily concerned with a technical goal,
the preservation and restoration of mental health; nevertheless,
its own development leads it, inevitably, to take up the role of
moral legislator. Similarly, religion is primarily concerned with
facilitating the acceptance of existential finitude; nevertheless, in
its historical role, it has itself always been a moral legislator.
What is needed, obviously, is a new reconciliation of the dominant
values of our society-and this is, in fact, one of the principal
endeavors of moral sensibility. It is a reconciliation that cannot
be undertaken defensibly . . . either by the scientific pretensions
of any form of psychotherapy or by the higher pretensions of re-
vealed religion; nevertheless, the reconciliation will have to be
one between the conflicting values of these two influential tradi-
tions.64
Since I have suggested that psychiatry is already an integral
part of the legal process and that as a body of knowledge attempt-
ing explanation of human action and motivation it must be rele-
vant to legal process merely to hold societal respect for the law,
should the law establish an official state therapeutical theory?
The suggestion is patently against our democratic position. This
would be tantamount to establishing a state religion. Mill has per-
haps best articulated our value position in this respect: 65
Strange it is that men should admit the validity of the arguments
for free discussion, but object to their being 'pushed to an ex-
treme'; not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme
case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should
imagine that they are not assuming infallibility, when they ac-
knowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects
which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular
principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because
it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain.
To call any proposition certain while there is anyone who would
deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to
assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are thejudges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.66
Even if we were to opt for the validity of one particular psy-
64 Margolis, supra note 45, at 146; see also J. FLUGEL, MAN, MORaLIS, AND
Soc3TY, A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY (1945).
65 Mill, On Liberty, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROm BACON TO MIL 949
(E. Burtt ed. 1939).
66 Id. at 965.
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choanalytic theory over the other, how as lawyers could we choose.
Truth through an elective process? Through empiricism? Through
the dominant school among practitioners? Through the persuasive
force-emotional, logical, of key spokesmen? The law is obviously
not in the position to choose between the various psychoanalytic
theories. Even using a "scientific" empirical base is nonavailing in
that the creative intuition of man often proves more tenable than
empirically "proven" theories.6 7 It is easy to say at this stage of
psychoanalytic theory that no determination can be made as to
which, if any of the many postulates, separately or eclectically will
lead to the ultimate knowledge of man's psyche. The law must ask
itself for what purposes does it mean or can it employ such theories.
The most obvious, it would seem, is predicting and structuring or
determining human action and thought. I join with Becker:
[I]f once we are in a position to determine man, are we going to
use this control? How? Who is going to use it-scientists?-
philosophers-kings? Toward what end? Obviously the question
is insurmountable; we cannot even entertain it if we value free-
dom. The point is that control of human life by a physical science
is antidemocratic and antihuman. Therefore we cannot envisage
it as a goal of science. Further, the conclusion is ineluctable:
if we had a science of the precise determinism of human behavior
we should have to repudiate it! It would be incompatible with a
belief in human possibility.6 8
We don't break the dilemma of having to use knowledge and
fearing the use of such knowledge by ignoring the problem. Other
institutions will inexorably make use of psychological findings
with relative degrees of efficacy.69 Moreover, certain insights are
common to the various psychological theories. All, it would seem,
would agree with Freud in some degree concerning an irrational
element in man, although there would probably be great dispute as
to the capacity of an individual to control his "unconsciousness" or
"irrational" elements. Psychoanalysis is a form of education to
67 See M. POLANYI, PFRSONAL KNowLEDGa TOWARDS A PosT-CemcAL
PHmLosoPHY (Harper Torchbook ed. 1964). "[T]he act of knowing
includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all
factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between sub-
jectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend
his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfill his personal
obligation to universal standards." Id. at 17.
68 Becker, supra note 57, at 215-16.
69 Consider the use of psychology of a Pavlovian type by the advertising
industry. See also M. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDNnG MEDIA: THE ExTEm-
SIONS or MAn (1964), and his contention that the medium, e.g., televi-
sion, in and of itself creates a certain type of sensitivity in man by its
very nature. The law must obviously take such insights into account
so, at least, as to prevent potential abuse.
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open a man to himself and to his society, to widen his area of
choice and increase his responsibility as to each particular choice.
It must be recognized especially that "normality," "responsibility,"
"pathology," "reality" inter alia are value statements, that labels
have viability only in relationship to other contrasting states, that
labels cannot pin down man's mutability. And yet practically
speaking a label once affixed establishes a certain set of legal and
social relationships, benefits, responsibilities, sanctions and stigmas.
Moreover, the very process of labeling can affect the very doctors
who ascribe the label in the type of treatment or lack thereof
which they accord.70 For example the American Psychiatric As-
sociation standard nomenclature defines a "simple schizophrenic
reaction":
This type of reaction is characterized chiefly by reduction in ex-
ternal attachments and interests and by impoverishment of human
relationships. It often involves adjustment on a lower psycho-
biological level of functioning, usually accompanied by apathy
and indifference but rarely by conspicuous delusions or halluci-
nations. The simple type of schizophrenic reaction characteris-
tically manifests an increase in the severity of symptoms over
long periods, usually with apparent mental deterioration, in con-
trast to the schizoid personality, in which there is little if any
change. 71
Becker, on the other hand, along with Szasz 72 thinks schizophrenia
is stupidity-"stupidity in a very basic area of experience, in pri-
mary enculturation data. The schizophrenic, lacking behavior pat-
terns, has no chance for manipulating means and ends. When his
world begins to slip away, his only recourse is to constrict his
means-ends control to such a narrow range that he turns into a
ludicrous caricature of cultural man." 73
One can readily see the value content of the respective defini-
tions and the potential of differing treatment because of definition.
Admitting then that not only cannot the law effectively choose
between the various theories, and that it does use them, and that
the law itself can be explained in its very processes by them,74
70 See, e.g., K. MENNINGEE, M. MAYmAN, & P. PRUYSER, THE VITAL BALANCE
(1963).
71 Katz, supra note 21, at 509.
72 T. SZAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS; FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961).
73 Becker, supra note 57, at 208.
74 See Bienenfeld, Prolegomena to a Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1965). "The universality of the various sections
of legal systems is due to claims based on common infant impulses.
For example, the legal section that concerns itself with social law is
based on the child's impulse to nurse; criminal law on the impulse to
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I repeat the question, how should the law treat psychological in-
sights? The law deals by its nature with value analysis; psy-
chological theories present a series of insights predicated in orien-
tation toward particular value results. Moreover, the mere fact
that a particular analyst belongs to a particular school is not neces-
sarily indicative of his particular methodological approach. He may
follow a number of variations from classical one-to-one analysis
with little therapeutic intervention, to psychotherapies, again based
on the same theory with relatively greater intervention, to actual
direct participation with the patient, to group therapies again with
relative degrees of intervention by the analyst, to pharmaceutical
(drug) or physical manipulation (shock therapy). Psychoanalytic
theories which attempt to extrapolate from the individual to a
philosophical system stand in the same relation to the law as com-
peting philosophical systems, with perhaps somewhat of a priority
because of a societal preference for "medical" theory.
Moving from psychoanalytic theory as Weltanschauung to spe-
cific uses of psychological theories as part of our already ongoing
legal process, we still must keep in mind the basic conflicting the-
oretical posits of the competing psychologies, the type of meth-
odology used by the particular practitioner and the relationship of
the employed methodology to the orienting theory. To further com-
plicate the process we must examine not only the value preference
of the particular psychological theory posited by the practitioner,
but also the biases that the psychiatrist or psychologist has as a
member of his profession, as a whole, and as a citizen in society.
Perhaps the most important aspect of treatment is the relationship
between analyst and patient. To be effective the psychiatrist must
often be above community prejudices and be able to neutralize his
own bias. But naturally, practitioners "try to select what they call
a good patient. We are not sure what attributes a good patient
must have, but they include sensitivity, intelligence, social and in-
tellectual standards similar to the psychiatrist's, a will to do one's
best, a desire to improve one's personality and status in life, youth,
attractiveness, and charm."
75
obey or disobey the father; the law of contracts on the impulse to co-
operate or compete; property law on the impulse for dependence or
independence." Id. at 960-61.
75 A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICK, SOCIAL CLASS AND M=NTAL ILLNESS: A
CowVn UNrT STUDY 192 (1958), quoted by Weihofen, Mental Health for
the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 920, 927, n. 34 (1966). Professor Weihofen
concludes "The poor need vastly expanded mental health services,
especially local community health centers. To raise the money to
build needed facilities and to find the personnel to staff them will
be prodigious tasks, but even if we accomplish them, we shall still face
the baffling problem of inducing the poor to use those services. The
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It is a shared axiom to most psychological theories that man's
early environment is at least somewhat relevant to his future psy-
chic potential in society. But Professor Weihofen, among many
commentators on the state of our poor, indicates: "We are in a
vicious circle of indigency, unplanned parenthood, and poor repro-
ductive quality .... We cannot, of course, assure every child good
genes or loving, competent parents. 'But it does not lie beyond
the reach of justice to insist that no child be negligently born ...
or negligently exposed after birth to surroundings, physical or
social, that alter his chances for a rewarding maturity.' "76
We can at this point ask how psychoanalysis can aid the law
in one specific area-the family law. We know that psychoanalytic
and sociological teachings can aid constructive, preventative leg-
islation through such projects as Head Start."1 Even here we
should realize that legal action implicitly reinforces value predilec-
tions, in this case the value that each citizen should be permitted
and sometimes compelled to become as responsible as possible in
his ability to choose between alternative actions. (We have other
problems when this model poor youth grows into "full potential"
and he is confronted with institutional blocks in attempting choice;
but we must first get the majority to this stage.) The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently 8 held that the lower
court, in a habeas corpus case where a finding was made that a
civilly committed woman, who was not immediately dangerous to
herself or others but who couldn't provide for herself, didn't have
the burden of showing alternative disposition; rather the lower
court was charged with the responsibility of creatively seeking
alternative remedies of disposition. The case is an indication of
the accepted responsibility of courts to understand and use all ave-
nues available to effectuate just results. The value sought to be
preserved in the instant case was individual freedom. But after
applauding the decision, we must examine what alternative dis-
positions are open and whether the court is willing to follow its
poor often do not recognize that they need help; even when they do,
they may not know that services exist or how to obtain them. They
are apathetic about finding out, or cynical, or hostile. That this atti-
tude of defeat, bitterness, and despair has become so widespread
throughout our nation is a damning indictment of our sins of the past.
It should shame and goad us to more heroic efforts now." Id. at 945.
76 Id. at 924 (footnotes omitted).
77 The thinking is that since the early years, at least according to Freudian
and Neo-Freudian theory, are significant in character formation, spe-
cial educational effort at pre-school age will ameliorate and add to the
intellectual stimulation necessary to the formation of an "integrated"
adult.
78 Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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logic to its proper conclusion, i.e., if there are no alternative insti-
tutional means, release the woman anyhow in that she is being
"illegally" detained. The trial courts then become increasingly de-
pendent on extralegal information, and institutions, e.g., welfare
reports and workers, orphan institutions, foster homes, inter alia.
Moreover, we are told that, "It becomes the duty of the law to
impinge upon the parent-child relationship at some of its criti-
cal points: divorce, separation, or death of the parents; delinquent
behavior of the child; abuse or neglect of the child; and adoption
of the child."79 In fact, the law is often called upon to intervene
in family law problems. How can psychoanalytic theory aid in
determining when and how to intervene?8 0 Professor George cut-
tingly lays out the basic assumptions implicit in our family law:
"(1) The marriage ceremony is a magic ritual which somehow
produces visible and ineradicable changes in its principal figures.
(2) The essence of marriage is the union of penis and vagina,
preferably for purposes of procreation. That these organs happen
to be attached to people is purely incidental.
(3) This predominantly genital union is not to be legally
broken up until one of the parties is clearly shown to be 'at fault.'
If there is relative equality of either fault or faultlessness, the
union must remain unbroken.
(4) Property and monetary payments are to be administered
as rewards to the good and chastisement to the bad.
(5) Children are indeed creatures, whose lives are the pro-
prietary interests of those who conceived and bore them. There-
fore, only the race, blood, heredity and religion of the parents are
relevant factors in determining the placement and career of the
child.
(6) Legal doctrines are effective devices to shape human con-
duct. When the law speaks, human actors will immediately con-
form their conduct to the law's expectations.
(7) All organs of government must order their activities as
the judges would have them do. Those who are married are mar-
ried for all purposes. Those who are not married are not married
for all purposes. Those who are illegitimate are illegitimate for
all purposes." 8'
79 Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CAlIaF. L. REV.
717 (1966).
80 See J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAmy AN THE LAw (1965) [herein-
after cited as Goldstein], for an analytical exposition of cases and ma-
terials relating to this and the whole gamut of issues relevant to the
family process.
81 George, Review of the Family and the Law, 75 YALE L.J. 504, 505 (1966).
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An examination of the relevance of psychoanalysis to all phases
of the family law process would be in order. But it will suffice for
the purposes of this article to examine but one series of issues in
the process-those relating to when the law should intervene in
the parental relationship for the so-called "best interests of the
child."
In passing I would like to indicate that the question is a
tougher one, I feel, than considering the use of psychoanalysis or
some other compulsory counseling in an attempt to prevent di-
vorce and as a precondition of divorce.82 The state in the latter
case, it seems to me, may make available counseling or psychologi-
cal services if it decides such services will have any efficacy but a
compulsory counseling is adverse to the tenets of almost all thera-
pies which opt for voluntary patients. Moreover, in light of limited
manpower expertise in this area it seems an inordinate resource
waste to force acceptance of services where such services are not
desired. But, the most significant issue is the explicit recognition
of lack of the individual couples' respective responsibility. 83 The
state has an interest in protecting the marriage institution (a
battle which it may be losing and which may not be worth the
effort without a modification of the relationship),84 To Lichten-
berger's argument 5 that divorce without fault based only on the
couple's desire may free an individual who will only go out and
repeat the experience with someone else (Freud's repetition com-
pulsion), I demur. We are not going to establish even a modicum
of individual responsibility if we are always legally foisting our
"help" onto others. Too often children grow up in a disharmoni-
ous atmosphere maintained "only" for the good of the children
which, in fact, because of the constant strain and hostility in the
environment redounds to the detriment of the children. We know
from psychoanalysis, if not common sense, that there is often a
neurotic symbiotic need on the part of each partner for the other.8 6
It is unlikely that such a relationship will be good, i.e., happy or
82 For a recent discussion of fault and nonfault bases for divorce see
Tenney, Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24
(1967); and in rebuttal Turner, Retreat from "Fault"?: An English
Lawyer's Views, 46 NEB. L. REV. 64 (1967).
88 For an indication of my views on responsibility in another area see
Kaplan, Experimentation-An Articulation of a New Myth, 46 NEB. L.
REV. 87 (1967).
84 See Redmount, An Analysis of Marriage Trends and Divorce Policies,
10 VAND. L. REV. 513 (1957).
85 Id. at 549 n. 87.
86 For a very short work on basic human emotions and relationship see
M. KLEIN & J. RIVIERE, LovE, HATE Am REPARATION (1937).
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dignified, in itself or reflect anything but venom, alienation and
dissatisfaction back into society. If one or both of the marital part-
ners, freed so benevolently by an easy divorce prescription, remar-
ries and causes further pain to himself and the new partner, I still
demur. Our recourse in such a case would be to place a mora-
torium either limited or indefinite on remarriage. A next step per-
haps would be to foster computerized matings. In fact, we could
also restrict by means of qualified or permanent birth control the
size of the population. With eugenically matched couples we should
produce a most capable society. If these alternatives seem fright-
ening as a denigration of human dignity, they are but a legal
recognition of relative degrees of human responsibility. I would
prefer to hold the individual to as much responsibility as pos-
sible while recognizing that some have at certain stages more
choice potential than others.8 7 I feel even if we had sufficient
analysts to examine and "treat" each individual who wanted a
divorce, often the marriage would not be saved and might not be
worth saving. Rather the law should take into account some of
man's basic drives and reexamine the potentiality of marriage as an
institution in satisfying those needs.88 At least the law should
undertake to be a non-repressing societal force (if that is a pos-
sibility and not an internal contradiction). Our society sees the
marriage institution losing its initial property conserving and
maintenance function. The family is, moreover, losing significance
as the prime socializing institution of the young. Increasingly
school and television are sharing and usurping 9 this role.
But I do not feel that the family is destined to lose its import-
ance in our society, or that the law can significantly break through
man's repression (to use Freudian terminology) or to compel man
to responsibly face his ontological alienation (to use existential
shorthand). But the law should not be a repressing force where it
does not have to be. Society is and probably will remain more than
sufficiently conservative without further legal reinforcement. Lib-
87 This does not mean I would abandon our mens rea formulation for
criminal responsibility. I do not think each individual is always in
control or even aware of his motivations.
88 Most of our benighted sex laws would be revoked. The couple might
be encouraged to sample each other on all levels for a time before
hastily undertaking marriage. Moreover, the law might encourage
moratoria on the relationship at agreed upon intervals so each partner
could satisfy his natural curiosity with others without shame, guilt or
community obloquy reinforced by the legal framework.
89 "Usurping" is probably the wrong word; often responsibility for the
education of the young is happily relinquished or never even under-
taken.
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eralized divorce policies won't cause a societal disintegration to any
greater extent than corrupt and corrupting marriages. Psycho-
analysis can indicate that the trend should be toward increasing
opportunity economically and emotionally. It can also be em-
ployed as a methodology to conform individual neurotics to an ex-
ternal society which will often encourage retreat. (It must be
recognized that these are all valuational terms, and that each in-
dividual has his own personal validity, identity pursuit and reality.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the reality of an halluci-
nating schizophrenic. He is most probably suffering, but he per-
haps suffered in his "normal" existence before regression to "pri-
mary process" [to use Freudian language]). Moreover, there is
nothing inherently evil about the individual today who for "kicks"
or for genuine philosophical predilection takes an LSD trip. His
reality in the "high" state is as relevant and as real to him as
television or The New York Times is to us.
I am not commending the schizophrenic state or the use of
LSD, I am suggesting and, in fact, stressing, that the burden of
legal intervention in either case rests heavily on the democratic
state. Situation ethics suggests that each individual must make
his own moral choices in accordance with the one prevailing value,
agape.90  Sherman and Lewis have recently depicted one of the
primary life styles of youth today:
Many critics, both in the United States and abroad, have re-
cently complained that the youth on the streets of our cities are
no longer the alienated intellectuals and activists demonstrating for
social change, but the teeny-boppers out for "kicks." That is to
say, SDS has been rejected in favor of LSD. But what Antonioni
and other critics cannot understand is that if one "turns on, tunes
in, and drops out," it is not an escape from reality, not a refusal
to commit oneself, but a movement toward a different level of
perception of what we call "reality." It is the most radical form
of commitment. The exploration of "inner space" is a revolu-
tionary act.91
We have too long acquiesced to the damning false security and
corruption of "society has a right to protect itself." Our democratic
tradition holds the individual sacrosanct as long as he proscribes no
other's freedom or privilege. This at least is the theory. Lawyers
have the obligation to assess the facts. It is too easy to use psycho-
analytic labels of mental illness to avoid confrontation with basic
issues of individual rights. Does not the individual have the right
to be sick? The difficulty becomes where the individual is con-
taminating or will imminently contaminate others. This is pos-
90 See J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETmIcs: THE NEw MoRALITY (1966).
91 L. LEWIs & W. SHERMAN, LANDSCAPE OF CONTEMPORARY CUNEMA 3 (1967).
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sible both with organic illness and certain states of psychic exist-
ence (or mental illness, if you please). The law can undoubtedly,
and must, intervene to save the life of others in such cases as
threats of epidemic through such preventative actions as quaran-
tine.
But what standards are applicable in a case like Painter v.
Bannister?92 In Painter the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the
maternal grandparents of a then seven year old boy could maintain
custody over the "rights" of the natural father. The father had
left the boy with the grandparents after the sudden death of the
boy's mother and sister. The father after two years remarried and
sought custody, which the disapproving grandparents rejected. De-
spite no finding of the father's unfitness, the court ruled for the
grandparents indicating as grounds the stability and solid middle
class upbringing accorded the boy by his grandparents. More-
over, the court placed reliance on psychological testimony that the
grandparents had become parental figures, that change in envir-
onment could prove detrimental to the boy and that "'the chances
are very high (Mark) will go wrong if he is returned to his
father.' ))93
Ironically, protest is most often heard from reformers that
children are not chattel; that parents have only limited rights in
children; and that the placing of children should be in the "best
interests of the child." In this case the court decided that the
child's best interests were to grow up in the Midwest even though
"In the Painter home, Mark would have more freedom of conduct
and thought with an opportunity to develop his individual talents.
It would be more exciting and challenging in many respects, but
romantic, impractical and unstable."94 Anna Freud suggests "the
best interests of an infant are safe-guarded under the condition
that three needs are fulfilled: the need for affection (for the un-
folding and centering of the infant's own feelings); the need for
stimulation (to elicit inherent functions and potentialities); and
the need for unbroken continuity (to prevent damage done to the
personality by the loss of function and destruction of capacities
which follow invariably on the emotional upheavals brought about
by separation from death or disappearance of the child's first love-
objects).""
Applying these psychoanalytic insights to Painter we see that
92 No. 51974 (Sup. Ct. Iowa, Feb. 8, 1966), 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
93 Id. at 157.
94 Id. at 154.
95 See Goldstein supra note 80, at, 105a. .
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Mark would have affection from both vying families, that he would
perhaps have greater stimulation from his natural father, and
greater continuity with his grandparents. 96 Mark's age might make
a great difference; some analysts feel the first four years of life as
most significant in future developmental potential. The oedipal
period is also held by Freudians, particularly, to be vital to a child's
character progress. Mark is theoretically at the end of the oedipal
period, but this certainly varies in different individuals. Moreover,
we must analyze what traumatic effects, if any, Mark experienced
when his mother and sister suddenly died. He perhaps feels per-
sonal guilt on either an "unconscious" or fantasy level for his
mother's and/or sister's death-for his mother because of normal
incestuous desires (oedipal) and also possibly because of ambiv-
alency toward her (it is possible he didn't want to share his father
with her, or her with his father). His guilt, if any, for the death of
his sister could arise from the jealousy of sibling rivalry. We
can speculate that he might think his mother's death was a per-
sonal rejection.97 In short, any of the above speculations are within
the range of possibility and perhaps probability. Separation (break-
ing of newly established continuity) could signify to him that he is
a failure or evil, that no one wants him.98
But we do not know, and a psychoanalyst, psychologist, or any
other expert "soul" doctor can only speculate on the ramifications
of choosing the maternal grandparents over the natural father's
new family. We don't know and can only surmise Mark's resiliency
in the face of change. The court in Painter rests on firm psy-
chological grounds. But does this end the case? The stimulation
factor was, as stated, pro the natural father. Isn't this important
to both Mark and society? Opting for the father's custody in this
case could widely increase Mark's future potential responsibility
choice range, or the traumatic break in relationship with his grand-
parents could leave him permanently restricted, alienated, or
96 We can, of course, further complicate the analysis by bringing in other
extant theoretical analysis, but this will suffice to indicate the difficulty
of analysis.
97 For problems and approaches to child psychoanalysis see A. FREuD,
NoRmAiry AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD (1965).
98 I don't know in this case whether the trial court asked Mark what he
wanted. Such a question could cut for good or bad. If the court asks
but ignores Mark's opinion, he may feel more futile than if he is not
asked at all. Even under the guidance of a subtle and trust-inspiring
court, questioning Mark may force him into a position to choose, thereby
rejecting one family over another, which could create present and fu-
ture guilt, i.e. he may later ask if a "natural" son repudiates his own
father. Depending on age and circumstances I would opt for the child's
opinion being taken into consideration.
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embittered. A Jungian or an analyst with existential proclivities
would perhaps posit that in either case Mark is responsible for any
self limitation, that he can discover (if a Jungian) or make (if an
existentialist) his own world. In this case the choice of the father
would seem superior because of the increased chance that his father
will demand greater intellectual responsibility on the basis of per-
sonal choice than the more conforming grandparents (to use the
court's characterization). 99 The Painter court bravely abandoned
a safe parental rights test, but as in the law of conflicts, it was
then forced to confront assorted and conflicting interests with vary-
ing value shadings. I cannot fault the Painter court for conserva-
tism, for favoring a "middle class" over a "bohemian" morality
for Mark's benefit; I can point out that the "best interests of the
child" as a criterion is inordinately complex and any decision spec-
ulative at least. Moreover, other competing tests should be evalu-
ated, e.g., the best interests of the individuals who seek custody
and the ramifications of any intervention or disposition ultimately
to the society. From personal bias toward intellectual stimulation
and potential and since affection would not be diminished, I, on
reading the paper record (which is necessarily sterile) would have
opted for the paternal father.
In the Painter case, our question of disposition was between
two competing, competent and loving households. The law is
often not so lucky in alternatives. The recent Liuni case which
excited popular indignation in New York presented the problem of
removing a foster child who had lived with a family almost from
birth from that family.100 The welfare authorities in good faith
felt that the little blonde girl shouldn't for her own good be re-
tained in custody by the family who, they felt were becoming too
attached to her. The board, among other and unreported reasons,
felt the Liunis too old to be parents for this girl. There was no
question of love and care involved. Popular pressure resulted in
custody for the Liunis. This case is easy for me. The competing
dispositions were the Liunis who had affirmed and proven their
love and care for the child and unknown, undesignated foster par-
ents, or an interim or permanent institutionalization.' 0 ' To break
99 Certainly a Freudian analyst may also decide that in Mark's case the
stimulation factor outweighs continuity. Some perhaps would even
challenge continuity with the grandparents and argue a recontinuity
with the natural father.
100 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1966, at 1, col. 4-7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1966,
at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1966, at 35, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Nov.
29, 1966, at 39, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1967, at 30, col. 2.
101 It should be indicated, however, that the welfare authorities' concern
necessarily includes more than the one case. Often public and private
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up a relationship which has become as close and perhaps closer than
many natural ones impinges upon the security of the family unit
which supposedly we wish to strengthen. Psychoanalytically,
affection, stimulation and continuity were all safeguarded by the
decision to keep the child with the Luinis.
Passing over the many other very real situations and combina-
tions of events which confront the law, I would like to turn to one
more model which further indicates the difficulty of policy con-
siderations and psychoanalytic relevance or lack thereof to the
question of parental and child interests and rights. Freud has
stated: "It follows from the nature of the facts which form the
material of psycho-analysis that we are obliged to pay as much
attention in our case histories to the purely human and social
circumstances of our patients as to the somatic data and the symp-
toms of the disorder. Above all, our interest will be directed to-
wards their family circumstances.' 10 2 Recent researchers have
presented rich interrelational case analyses highly indicative of
the etiological relationship of schizophrenia to the family unit.103
The family despite all talk of its disintegration is still a signifi-
cant institution in raising, socializing and channeling our young.
If a particular family environment is socially diseased, how can we
tell; would or should we intervene and remove the children from
the tainted environment? Carrying out our earlier analogy if we
agencies place children with foster homes for natural parents who are
assured they will later be able to regain custody. Often such parents
are in an emergency state and can't in good faith care for the child
during a particular interval; yet they relinquish control only on the
assurance that they will get their child back. Foster parents, who are
generally a more favorable alternative than an institution, may after
an interval become attached to the child and fight threatened loss of
custody. Moreover, the welfare agencies are particularly sensitive to
public opinion and any judgment error reflects back to their detriment.
102 T. Liz, S. FLECK & A. CORNEUSON, ScHIzoPHRENIA AND THE FAmILY 11
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Lidz].
103 "Initially, we hoped that we might find some elements or factors within
the family that led to schizophrenic development of an offspring. A
plethora rather than a paucity of findings of potential significance
created the problem. In each aspect of the family life which we ex-
amined something was seriously amiss. The parental personalities,
the parents' marital interaction, the relationship of each parent to the
child, the verbal and nonverbal communication within the family, the
essential adherence to parental and childhood generation tasks and
roles, the structure of the family as a unit, the parents' gender-linked
roles, the transmission of the culture's techniques of adaptation, the
relatedness of the family to the community: these and other facets
were all seriously disturbed in our judgment-and various authorities
who examined the protocols agreed." Id. at 27.
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step into situations of organic epidemic proportions, shouldn't we
intervene where we see the transmission of psychic distortion
and pain?104 I would like to present a case study of a schizophrenic
patient from a middle to upper class family, treated in a superior
psychiatric institution.10 5
The patient Emil Dolfuss was twenty-six years old when he was
transferred from another hospital to which he had been ad-
mitted for the second time following a serious suicidal attempt.
At the time of admission to the Yale Psychiatric Institute, he
conducted himself in a haughty and pompous manner, choosing
his words and accent carefully. He spoke calmly of his suicidal
attempt which, he explained, followed a quarrel with his mother.
He answered most questions in vague generalities and stated that
he was in the hospital because, "It's usually the case that one
hopes to become more stable and achieve a more harmonious re-
lationship to one's self and to one's family and others."
Overt psychotic behavior first appeared when Emil was twenty-
one, although we later learned that shortly after his father's
death when Emil was fourteen symptoms in the form of ideas of
persecution had occurred. Although Emil was highly intelligent,
his school record had been so poor that he could not gain admis-
sion to college and after a few years of aimless studying, he
traveled alone to the Orient although his family recognized then
that he was severely disturbed. While abroad, he developed
ideas of saving the world, lived out religious delusions, and was
returned to the United States by consular authorities after he
persistently attempted to contact the President. Emil was then
hospitalized for the first time for approximately eighteen months;
he received insulin and electric shock treatments and psycho-
therapy. During this hospitalization he was catatonic and ex-
hibited many rituals, most of which were derived from various
Eastern religions or philosophies; and he would periodically refuse
to eat meat. He declared his only sibling, Adele, a goddess, and
knelt and prayed in front of her before speaking to her. For a
period he became mute and refused to see his family.
Between hospitalizations, Emil maintained a marginal adjust-
ment, changing occupations often, but gradually he again became
preoccupied with Eastern religion and, at times, believed himself
a God. He insisted on having such brilliant lights turned on con-
stantly within and around his garage apartment that it dis-
turbed the neighborhood. After the argument with his mother
which concerned a religious trinket that belonged to a friend of
his father, Emil offered an engagement ring to his sister's friend
whom he knew but slightly, and ostensibly his suicidal attempt
followed the rejection of his proposal.
In our hospital the patient's behavior gradually deteriorated.
Because of his many pompous and unreasonable demands, he
104 For a fictionalized and poignant picture of a schizophrenic condition
see H. GREEN, I NEVER PROMISED YOU A RosE GARDEN (1964).
105 The institution is the Yale Psychiatric Institute and this case and other
cases of similar richness are interspersed through Lidz, supra note 102.
792 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 4 (1967)
found himself increasingly isolated from other patients who re-
sented in particular his attempts to enforce his belief that all
rooms must be fully illuminated around the clock. These and
other demands made it extremely difficult for the staff to main-
tain a harmonious and consistent attitude toward him, a factor
which contributed to his behavioral incontinence. At first he was
immaculately overdressed, as if he were at an exclusive English
country club, but then his dress became increasingly slovenly, and
he refused to shave or have his hair cut. Following a major
crisis about the lights five months after admission, Emil became
combative, remained mute for weeks, and refused to eat. He
then demanded and ate enormous quantities of beef for a period,
after which he put himself on a strictly vegetarian diet. From
this time on, he also steadfastly refused to wear trousers. He
would remain attired in shorts, a checkered waistcoat, and a
heavy jacket even on very hot days; later he wore only shorts
even in winter while insisting that his windows be open. He re-
fused to sleep in bed throughout the remainder of his hospital
stay and slept either standing up or in a chair. Emil was never
without light in his room. Although he acted as if he had the
right to command the staff to carry out his wishes, it was clear
that the absence of light caused him to panic and become com-
bative. He communicated with the staff by signs, charades, or in
a foreign language. He refused to wash or to be bathed, and
while quite oblivious to certain health hazards, he also pro-
pounded many faddish health theories and was deeply worried
about insufficient food supply. He hoarded food, especially candy,
fruits, and nuts in large quantities, and when his mother ob-
jected to these foods for health reasons, he accused her of stingi-
ness.
Emil also became quite interested in Jewish customs and
history (he had a Jewish therapist) and even wished to be cir-
cumcized, but in his behavior continued to adhere to the dicta of a
mysterious Eastern religion. In observance of the latter, he
counteracted gravity by never lying down, worshipped light,
and avoided "animal excitation" by not eating meat.
A vignette of Emil's life in our hospital follows: a tall,
bearded young man with hair to his shoulders, dressed only in
shorts stands in a room stacked with magazines and fruit, or sits
on the toilet in the adjacent bathroom reading the Wall Street
Journal. The doors and windows are open; he motions to a
passer-by in the hall to come into his room. There he forces a
sticky fig into the visitor's hand and makes a request in sign lan-
guage. When he is refused, he listens carefully, then shoves the
visitor out and shoots him with mock gestures.
The Family
Mr. Dolfuss, of a wealthy middle-class background, was sent
from Austria in early adulthood to conduct the American branch
of the family business. Mrs. Dolfuss who came from an Austrian
family of considerable renown also immigrated to this country as
a young adult. Ater they married, they moved to the home
near Boston which Mr. Dolfuss had established as a bachelor.
He ran his well-appointed home in the manner of European no-
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bility which set the family apart from the rest of the community.
The formality of the household was unusual-the chauffeur wore
white gloves even to shop for groceries, and all members of the
household had to dress formally every afternoon to receive the
master at the door. The children were permitted to be with
their parents only during specific hours. When at home, Mr. Dol-
fuss spent much of his time in his bedroom, where he was not to
be disturbed, and only his wife or the 'Friulein" was permitted
to look after his needs. He was mortally afraid of drafts, and
frequently suffered from colds. Usually he spent his time reading
about Eastern religion and philosophy while dressed only in his
underwear. From his reading he evolved a peculiar cult which
the family shared, but which allegedly was understood by only a
few select people. This Eastern philosophy somehow included
certain Christian traditions so that Christmas and winter-solstice
celebrations were combined. A ceremony of the lighting of can-
dles was preceded by a long speech by Mr. Dolfuss on the holi-
ness of light during which the entire household were required to
stand listening.
Mrs. Dolfuss considered her primary duty to be at the service
of her husband: she felt he was a great man and came to share
his beliefs to which she still adheres. After his death she con-
tinued to believe that her husband was still alive, dead but in
another reincarnation. The family members refused to elaborate
their religious beliefs to us because the religion was not to be
discussed with people not devoted to it. Even the daughter
maintained this reticence out of reverence for her father, although
she supposedly disavowed the creed.
The patient and his sister as children were cared for by the
Fraulein since the parents were frequently absent on long trips.
The Fraulein favored Emil over his sister, she treated him like a
little prince, and habitually slept with him. This nursemaid also
worshipped the father and claims even now that she understood
him better than did Mrs. Dolfuss. Thus, to the patient, his
mother who devoted most of her time and energy to her husband
represented remoteness, whereas the FrRulein mixed motherliness
and seductiveness with rigid reinforcement of the father's cold
formality and religious preoccupations. She had used harsh meth-
ods of toilet training.
When the patient was seven or eight, the nursemaid was dis-
missed by Mrs. Dolfuss, partly because of their competitive feel-
ings, but also because Emil's teachers complained that he had not
been taught the rudiments of self-care and that he was being
severely "spoiled" by his nurse. Supposedly, Emil did not react to
this separation. He showed little emotional disturbance until
shortly after his father's sudden death. For a few days following
this crucial event, Emil behaved appropriately, acting as the head
of the household during his mother's transient incapacitation in
the period of her acute bereavement. The patient has been quoted
as saying, "I have to be the man in the family now." Soon
thereafter he became delusional, believing that a light beam from
a tall building was following him. He told one of his psychia-
trists, "The loss of my father set me back, and I don't know how
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to describe the incomparable harm it did to my development of
all descriptions."
Other characteristics of the family interaction and attitude
must be mentioned. In line with his beliefs, the father dis-
approved of and never expressed any hostility. Everybody was
"happy" in this family-the mother, however, despite her sub-
servience, belittled and criticized the father's disinclination for
fresh air, sports, and physical activity. She was a food faddist
and considered physical culture extremely important for herself
and her children. She was always very parsimonious, leading
the patient to say, "I always gave my family large presents, but
they never gave me anything."'10 6
On the surface, this family and other families in the study,
appeared "normal" and perhaps above average. There was affec-
tion (if distorted), stimulation (if of a peculiar type) and con-
tinuity (taking into account, however, the early parental trip).
And yet the case history as even further developed than pre-
sented here convincingly indicates that Emil's condition is predi-
cated to a great degree on his developmental familial environment.
We should mention that in many of the studies the parents of the
schizophrenics were not only in good financial shape, but were as
intellectually endowed, if not more, than the norm. Moreover,
the individual parental partners were often thought to be success-
ful in the outside community, by the standards of the dominant
society. Often, however, the child formed distorted ego ideals
from parents who practiced other than they consciously preached.
Often the offspring became a focal point in a never ending battle
between the parents. Sometimes the offspring became an erotic
love object fulfilling the needs of one parent who thus broke gen-
erational boundaries. Ironically, the healthy partner many times
submitted family control and children upbringing to the more
"pathological" partner. We could go on and list various other in-
terrelationship "abnormalities" occurring in these cases but we have
enough for analysis already. It is already trite in our literature to
recognize our sexual role confusion. This confusion of the parent
who himself never "learned" how to act as a man or a woman is
generated to some degree, depending on the given school, to the
children who in turn transmit their individual and societal confu-
sions. We can talk of the seductive mother or father or the ineffec-
tual mother and father; we can assimilate the message that the
children may very well be harmed when judged by the types of
persons we allegedly opt for in our society; but can we intervene
without creating the danger of a more insidious type of harm.10 7
10 Lidz, supra note 102, at 163-68.
107 One afternoon in New Haven I noticed a mother sitting in a waiting
room holding her infant away from her, with the infant's head slanted
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In the range of mental states, schizophrenia, no matter how
defined and no matter how nebulous a characterization, is perhaps
the label with the most stigmatizing potential in our society. The
schizophrenic, whether voluntarily or through determining condi-
tions, has "opted" out of society and fruitful relationships. I am
not capable of assessing how much "schizophrenia" our society
can withstand before whole sections "opt" out. I do think that we
must establish procedural safeguards to allow the individual to
"opt" out while encouraging him to remain committed to society.
Flag waving is to no avail. We must attempt to delineate and
develop values to which the individual can remain thinkingly
and emotionally cathected.
A nonaction is obviously a decision as much as is an affirma-
tive intervention. While psychoanalysis can describe Emil's devel-
opment to the schizophrenic stage, it is a much greater, in fact at
this stage, an impossible burden to predict beforehand an ultimate
individual outcome. We can through psychoanalytic insights read
many of the factors which contribute toward the outcome of the
emotionally restricted or pained man. We can understand then
to some degree how and why Emil developed as he did. Particu-
larly astute observers could perhaps have intuited Emil's poten-
tial disintegration. But the privacy and integrity of the family is
still too prized to randomly or selectively eavesdrop on the given
family unit. Separation from even the bad family environment
often creates more fertile potential for trauma and disintegration
than does no intervention. Moreover, institutionalization because
of manpower problems, inter alia, is generally not a preferred dis-
position.
We can, of course posit a Spartan solution to child development
and conditioning. We can remove children from parents at certain
ages and raise them "in conformity" with the best insights, toward
the best goals we can postulate. But this is not a very realistic
option in this society at this juncture. We can add necessary funds
as a priority to such institutionalized programs as Head Start at
early stages of the child's life. But as in the case of Emil, we must
recognize that the middle class and upperclass can be emotionally
impoverished. We have statutes which call for doctors' reports
toward the ground. The mother's facial expression seemed flat in my
"expert" opinion. The mother didn't seem to be relating warmly with
or to the child. I didn't discern the basic trust elements discussed by
analysts like Erickson. Should the law have taken the child away from
that mother, or treated that mother recognizing that all mothers are
not loving or "capable" of loving. But perhaps this was a good mother
seen at a time when she was harassed, tired and not very loving (seen,
in fact, by a not very knowledgeable expert).
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where the "battered child" is found. A "psychically battered"
child is often worse off than the physically traumatized infant.
And yet I maintain that with all our psychoanalytic knowledge,
intervention leading to separation is a dangerous and generally
nonpreferred step-dangerous not only to the child but also to other
stipulated values of society. Institutional intervention is prone to
lead to a deadening conformity, to a denial of the richness of human
potential. Not only the family but society failed Emil, but Emil
failed himself (if as a value consideration we deem his state
failure). The Promethean man may also push himself to madness
or individual ecstasy.
If as I state, the law must at this stage enter a family structure
like the Dolfuss' very warily, even if it can isolate the true fac-
tors leading to Emil's subsequent breakdown before the fact, the
burden becomes heavier than in intervening in less pathological
(again recognize the value content of this term) environments.
What then can the law do, if anything? The law as a structuring
framework of society can and must guarantee individual freedom
of movement and expression until imminent danger to others, i.e.,
until a Charles J. Whitman starts climbing the tower with his "can
of deodorant." Intervention after a fact is too late. Certainly we
must safeguard procedural process throughout the law when once
we invoke it. But the law is more than judicial interpretation in
individual cases, for it also has the capacity and obligation to allow
the individual to expand or to drop out. And it can certainly
encourage expansion.
We generally have opted for a system of compulsory education
often to the detriment of well integrated and respectable societal
communities; e.g., the Amish are constantly subject to pressure to
bring their children to school. I oppose such a coercive process.
But since we have so opted (and at this stage at least abdicating
my responsibility for articulating my dissent), we must reassess
our educational processes. 0 8 Our system of government can only
succeed as long as it remains true to our procedural values and
persuasively articulates reasons for value choice where conflict
ensues. The goal of all jurisprudences is movement toward the
dignity of man which can only mean the responsibility of man-a
responsibility which will remain mythical the more the law circum-
scribes instinctual outlets. I do not oppose community health sta-
tions manned by trained and compassionate analysts and social
workers, but we cannot coerce attendance and expect responsibility.
108 The literature pro and con on educational reform is so widespread and
community knowledge such as to leave to the reader's own discerning
evaluation the manifold problems here.
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Nor can we say thus that the individual should help himself when
we know that in much of our society the individual starts so down
as to be potentially circumscribed forever. We must encourage
the rich variety of human action and viewpoint. Let the law
worry about dignity and the individual worry about his own stand-
ard of happiness which may be ultimately only relative, an ephi-
nary, or a cosmic Oneness.
CONCLUSION
I have intermixed the terms psychology, psychoanalysis and
psychiatry throughout this article. I now maintain despite the
individual theoretical positions of the various schools and methodol-
ogies that the two basic levels of relevance between them and the
law are ultimately one. Any psychology which can and is extrapo-
lated into a whole theory of the nature of man necessarily focuses
on the individual with that whole philosophical position in mind.
This position no matter how ethically neutral seeks the change or
cure of the voluntary or coerced patient. The patient has a right
to select his own medicine through any church, philosophy or psy-
chology of his choice. Medical intervention on the psychic level
is speculative at best, often frustrating and nugatory and, if co-
erced, in derogation of individual choice. When we opt for inter-
vention then we are opting for a whole series of value structures
and denying an equally valid series. The law must shoulder a
heavy burden in active intervention indeed.
Moreover, the choice between the competing schools of psy-
chology and methodology is still speculative at best, although when
the polemic clears, many common insights are evidenced. We en-
courage commitment to values we hold dear. Therapists and the-
oreticians no matter how objective remain committed to their per-
sonal theoretical postulates, although indeed practice often dis-
avows theory. This does not mean that we should eschew any
legal recognition of the relevancy of psychological theories to the
law, but rather we must recognize the value content and potential
insights of each. The man without a philosophy is often adrift,
but blind commitment to a false god through legal structures must
necessarily destroy legal efficacy. We have come full face; psy-
chological theories are more relevant in explaining and modify-
ing legal structures than as pragmatic tools intervening in indi-
vidual cases-too often to the potential detriment of the individual.
Doctors generally don't prescribe medicine until they know how it
works. And yet at some stage even doctors must experiment.
Our one human hope is that mankind cannot be bounded by the-
oretical postulates, that man will be able to defy descriptive cate-
gorization without destroying himself.
